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 DOES THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME?: 
APPLYING EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO GEORGIA’S 
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE AND 
RESIDENCY AND EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 
FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Rebecca Shepard* 
INTRODUCTION 
If there is “a race to the bottom to see who can most thoroughly 
ostracize and condemn” sex offenders among states and 
municipalities, Georgia is a front runner.1 Georgia’s laws for 
convicted sex offenders are among the toughest in the United States,2 
including a sex offender registry and residency and employment 
restrictions.3 Once a person has been convicted of certain sexual 
crimes,4 as well as of certain crimes against minors, regardless of 
                                                                                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Jonathan Todres 
for his valuable feedback and advice, and thanks to my family—Clint, Robin, and Eli—for their 
unending patience and support. 
 1. Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the State of 
Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 514 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 515 (quoting Georgia State Representative Jerry Keen discussing residency and 
employment restrictions for registered sex offenders); Amanda West, The Georgia Legislature Strikes 
with a Vengeance! Sex Offender Residency Restrictions & the Deterioration of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 239, 239–41 (2007); Id. at 239 n.4 (comparing Georgia statutes with 
statutes from twenty-two other states also imposing restrictions on convicted sex offenders). 
 3. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). 
 4. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Offenders must register if they are convicted of committing the 
following sexual crimes on or after July 30, 2001, against a victim who is a minor: criminal sexual 
conduct toward a minor, solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct, use of a minor in a sexual 
performance, solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, or any conviction resulting from a sexual 
offense against a minor victim. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010). A victim is defined as a 
“minor” if she or he is under age eighteen at the time of the offense. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) 
(2010). Offenders must also register if they are convicted of any dangerous sexual offense, regardless of 
the age of the victim. Dangerous sexual offenses include: rape, aggravated assault with the intent to 
commit rape, sodomy, aggravated sodomy, statutory rape if the convicted individual is at least twenty-
one years of age, child molestation, aggravated child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, 
sexual assault against a person in custody, incest, second conviction of sexual battery, aggravated sexual 
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whether the criminal activities were of a sexual nature,5 he is required 
to register and comply with residency and employment restrictions.6 
In Georgia, minors who are convicted of sex offenses must comply 
with the same registry and residency requirements as adult sex 
offenders.7 This is not limited to violent crimes or acts that are 
predatory in nature.8 The result: Georgia teenagers can be convicted 
                                                                                                                 
battery, sexual exploitation of children, electronically furnishing obscene material to minors, computer 
pornography and child exploitation, obscene telephone contact, any sexual offense or attempted sexual 
offense against a victim who is a minor. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010). 
 5. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Offenders must register as a sexual offender if they are convicted 
of committing the following crimes on or after July 30, 2001, even if the crimes were not sexual in 
nature: kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
12(a)(9)(B) (2010). A victim is a “minor” if she or he is under the age of eighteen at the time of the 
offense. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Kidnapping or false imprisonment involving a victim 
who is less than fourteen years old, except by a parent, is considered a “dangerous sexual offense” and 
convicted offenders must register as sexual offenders, even if the offensive conduct is not sexual. GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010). See also Bill Rankin, Ga. Supreme Court Rebuffs Sex Offender 
Registry Challenge, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta/ga-supreme-
court-rebuffs-371444.html (discussing an example of an offender required to register as a sex offender 
when the underlying crime, kidnapping, was not sexual in nature). 
 6. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). Any individual required to register under GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-1-12 (2010) may not reside within one thousand feet of any childcare facility, church, school, or 
area where minors congregate. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010). The restrictions on employment are 
slightly less strict: no individual required to register as a sexual offender may volunteer or be employed 
at any entity within one thousand feet of a childcare center, school, or church, but the employment 
restrictions do not extend to entities near “areas where minors congregate.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
15(c) (2010). “Areas where minors congregate” are defined by statute as including: all public and 
private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, 
school bus stops, public libraries, and public community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
12(a)(3) (2010). A registered sex offender who knowingly violates the residency and employment 
restrictions “shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor 
more than 30 years.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(g) (2010). 
 7. Juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent are not required to register, nor are those convicted of 
misdemeanors. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(C) (2010). In Georgia, the legal age of majority is 
eighteen, and all persons under eighteen are minors. GA. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1(a) (2010). However, 
seventeen-year-old minors who commit offenses are tried as adults in Georgia; they are not under the 
jurisdiction of state juvenile courts. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(2)(A) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
28 (2010). Furthermore, any minor between ages thirteen and seventeen who is charged with a crime 
can be tried in superior court and convicted of a felony. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(1) (2010). 
Minors who commit any of seven crimes are automatically tried as adults and in superior court: murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual 
battery, or armed robbery with a firearm. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (2010). 
 8. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Examples of offenses that trigger the registration requirement, but 
may be non-violent or may occur in the context of a peer-on-peer relationship when perpetrated by a 
juvenile offender include: electronically furnishing obscene material to a minor, solicitation of a minor 
to engage in sexual conduct, and the catchall “[a]ny conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense” 
against a minor victim. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) 
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of sex offenses and required to register as sex offenders and comply 
with strict residency and employment requirements for behavior that 
may be quite different from the predatory offenses usually brought to 
mind by the term “sex offender.”9 
For example, a high school sophomore in Georgia was arrested in 
spring 2010 for furnishing obscene material to a minor.10 If charged 
under Georgia’s child pornography laws and convicted, this 
seventeen-year-old boy would be required to register as a sex 
offender who committed a “dangerous sexual offense” and prohibited 
from residing or loitering near any area where minors congregate—
including his own high school.11 What behavior warrants these severe 
consequences? He sent a naked picture of himself to a sixteen-year-
old friend via text message, also known as “sexting.”12 Does the 
punishment fit the crime? 
This Note explores whether, when applied to minors, Georgia laws 
requiring registration as a sex offender and restricting residency and 
employment based on registration violate the Eighth Amendment 
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.13 Part I discusses 
Georgia’s current requirements for sex offenders, including 
registration, residency, and employment restrictions.14 Part II 
considers the constitutional validity of these restrictions as applied to 
                                                                                                                 
(2010). Some peer-on-peer conduct satisfies the elements of sexual crimes, even though it may be non-
violent or consensual. See, e.g., Wendy S. Cash, A Search for “Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation” in 
Wilson v. State, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 225, 226–28 (discussing the case of Genarlow Wilson, a 
seventeen-year-old boy charged and convicted of felony aggravated child molestation for having 
received consensual oral sex from a fifteen-year-old girl in 2003, conduct that would be a misdemeanor 
under current Georgia law). 
 9. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). 
 10. Jeffry Scott, Atlanta Schools, Parents, and Law Try to Deal with Sexting, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-schools-parents-and-482243.html (reporting two 
incidents of “sexting” in metro Atlanta schools resulting in different consequences for the teenaged 
offenders, including this incident in which a seventeen-year-old boy was arrested and charged with 
furnishing obscene material to a minor after sending a naked picture of himself via cell phone text 
message to a sixteen-year-old girl, who forwarded the picture to four other students). 
 11. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(e)(2) (2010); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010). 
 12. Scott, supra note 10. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
15 (2010). 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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juvenile sex offenders in light of two considerations: Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence on proportionality of punishments, and 
recent scientific research on brain development in adolescents.15 In so 
doing, Part II applies the proportionality analysis from the United 
States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Graham v. Florida16 to the 
Georgia sex offender statutes and evaluates how recent scientific 
developments inform analysis of Georgia laws.17 Finally, Part III 
proposes changes that address the constitutional concerns raised by 
the restrictions on juvenile sex offenders in Georgia, while also 
serving the public interest in protecting children from sex offenders.18 
I. GEORGIA’S SEX OFFENDER STATUTES 
A. Georgia Sex Offender Registry And Residency And Employment 
Restrictions And Their Application To Sex Offenders Who Are 
Minors 
Georgia law provides that any individual convicted of certain 
sexual crimes register by providing his name, address, employer, 
fingerprints, and other information to the sheriff of his county of 
residence.19 The sheriff’s office of each Georgia county maintains 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See discussion infra Part II. See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Jessica E. Brown, Classifying Juveniles “Among the Worst Offenders”: 
Utilizing Roper v. Simmons to Challenge Registration and Notification Requirements for Adolescent 
Sex Offenders, 39 STETSON L. REV. 369 (2010); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, 
Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Elizabeth S. 
Scott & Lawrence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003). 
 16. 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23. The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Graham v. Florida 
delineates a model for reviewing whether a sentence is categorically “cruel and unusual” based on 
proportionality. Id. In Graham, the Court’s analysis weighs the culpability of the actor and suggests that 
scientific developments in psychology and neurology inform our understanding of the culpability of 
juvenile offenders. Id. at 2026. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III. 
 19. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(16) (2010). “Required registration information” that the offender 
must provide includes: name; social security number; age; race; sex; date of birth; fingerprints; 
photograph; physical description; address; identifying information if the offender’s residence is a trailer, 
vessel, mobile home or otherwise moveable; employment information; vehicle description and license 
number; and crimes for which she was convicted. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text for 
crimes that trigger the registration requirement. For an offender being released from prison, the 
information is gathered prior to his release, but after release the offender must update the information on 
the registry within seventy-two hours of moving to a new residence. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(b) 
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this information, and it must be publicly available at county offices 
and on the internet.20 Thus, in addition to facilitating the state in 
keeping tabs on sex offenders, the registry creates a means by which 
“[w]ith the click of a mouse, [anyone] can now download the name, 
photograph, and address of every sex offender in our communities.”21 
While “‘sex offender’ is synonymous with a pedophile or rapist to 
most lay audiences” that is not the case for all offenders required to 
register under Georgia’s statutes, for several reasons.22 First, 
offenders convicted of certain crimes against minors are classified as 
sex offenders, even though their criminal activities were not sexual in 
nature.23 Second, minors can be required to register for offenses 
involving victims who are their peers or even activities where all 
parties consented, such as the sexting example above.24 Third, since 
the registry requirement and residency and employment restrictions 
apply uniformly to all offenders,25 regardless of the underlying 
                                                                                                                 
(2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(f) (2010). 
 20. The sex offender registry list must be available to the public on the sheriff’s website and in the 
sheriff’s office, any county administrative building, the administrative building of any municipal 
corporation, and the office of the clerk of the superior court. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(i)(3) (2010). 
 21. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 514. 
 22. Id. at 517. 
 23. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Offenders must register as a sexual offender if they are convicted 
of kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor on or after July 30, 2001, even if the crime involved no 
sexual conduct, except when committed by a parent. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010). See 
also Rankin, supra note 5 (discussing an example of a Georgia man required to register as a sex 
offender when the underlying crime was not sexual in nature). 
 24. Scott, supra note 10 (providing one example of a teen arrested for text messaging a naked image 
to a peer). Some teen-on-teen behaviors that once gave rise to felony convictions even though the 
“victim” consented, such as statutory rape or consensual oral sex, are now addressed through “Romeo 
and Juliet” exceptions. In Georgia, when the victim is between the ages of fourteen and sixteen (for 
statutory rape and child molestation) or between the ages of thirteen and sixteen (for sodomy, including 
oral and anal sex), and the offender is eighteen years old or younger and no more than four years older 
than the victim, the offense is only a misdemeanor. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2006), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf (tracking the 2006 
amendments to sex offense statutes incorporating these “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions). See 
Grovenstein v. State, 637 S.E.2d 821, 822–23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (vacating the requirement that a man 
register as a sex offender despite having pled guilty to sexual battery because the consensual sexual 
incident would be treated as a misdemeanor offense under the 2006 amendments to the sex offender 
registry statute). However, other offenses for which conviction would result in registration as a sex 
offender do not have “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions for offenders who perpetrate the behavior with or 
against a peer. 
 25. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(20) (2010) (defining a “sexual offender” as any individual 
“convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or any dangerous sexual offense,” 
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criminal behavior, all offenders categorized as sex offenders are 
“treated . . . like the worst offender.”26 Legislators advocating these 
strict limitations for sex offenders, even after offenders have served 
their prison sentence and probation, proclaim their intent to prevent 
criminals from “prey[ing] on innocent children.”27 Courts hearing 
challenges to sex offender registry and residency restrictions have 
affirmed this intent to “protect children from known sex offenders.”28 
Yet, juvenile offenders, who may be unlikely to pose any further 
threat to children, are treated the same as all other sex offenders.29 
The 2006 amendments to the residency and employment 
restrictions for sex offenders30 made Georgia’s sex offender laws the 
“toughest . . . in the country.”31 The residency restrictions prevent 
individuals from living within one thousand feet of any childcare 
facility, church, school, or area where minors congregate.32 The 
employment restrictions are slightly less extensive, forbidding sex 
offenders from working or volunteering at a school, church, or 
childcare facility or any entity within one thousand feet of such 
                                                                                                                 
although those offenses, as defined by GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) and GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
12(a)(10)(B), encompass a wide range of conduct (emphasis added)). 
 26. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 518. 
 27. Id. at 516 (quoting Georgia State Representative Jerry Keen, a sponsor of the 2006 bill making 
the residency and employment restrictions stricter in Georgia (citing Ga. H.R. 1059)). 
 28. West, supra note 2, at 247 & n.39 (citing multiple federal and state court decisions 
acknowledging the intent of residency restrictions to protect public safety, particularly the safety of 
children). 
 29. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(20) (2010). As of March 31, 2011, Georgia’s sex offender registry 
includes 19,620 registered sex offenders, including twenty-one children aged seventeen or younger. GA. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, GEORGIA’S REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/channel_modifieddate/0,2096,67862954_87983024,00.html. For profiling 
purposes, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation includes eighteen-year-old offenders with the youngest 
set of adult offenders. Id. There are currently 1,378 sex offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five residing 
in Georgia. Id. 
 30. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(20) (2010); 1996 Ga. Laws 1520 (establishing the original sex 
offender registry in Georgia); Geraghty, supra note 1, at 515–18. 
 31. West, supra note 2, at 239 (quoting the sponsor of the 2006 bill, Rep. Jerry Keen of Georgia 
House District 179); see also BRENDA V. SMITH, FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS, NIC/ WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON RAPE (2009) (reporting 
sex offender registration, residency and employment statutes and their application to juveniles for every 
state and the District of Columbia); discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
 32. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). Any individual required to register under title 42, chapter 1, 
section 12 of the Georgia Code may not reside within one thousand feet of any childcare facility, 
church, school, or area where minors congregate. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010). See also Ga. 
H.R. 1059 (tracking the 2006 amendments to sex offense statutes). 
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places.33 The consequences for failing to comply with these 
restrictions are severe: once a sex offender is aware that she resides 
within one thousand feet of a forbidden entity, she must move 
immediately or face a prison sentence between ten and thirty years.34 
Further, the definition of areas where minors congregate35 is so broad 
it excludes sex offenders from most residential areas of the state.36 
Residency restrictions like these make it so difficult for sex offenders 
to find a place to live in the state that the “laws act as the ‘effective 
equivalent of banishment.’”37 
B. Legal Challenges To Georgia Sex Offender Statutes 
Georgia’s sex offender registry and residency and employment 
restrictions have faced several legal challenges.38 As passed in 2006, 
the residency restrictions did not include any exceptions for sex 
offenders who owned their homes prior to the implementation of the 
restrictions, or who owned their homes before a school, daycare or 
other area where minors congregate came to them.39 A sex offender 
ordered to vacate his home and business when childcare centers 
opened near both places challenged the law as an unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 33. No individual required to register as a sexual offender may volunteer or be employed at any 
entity within one thousand feet of a childcare center, school, or church, but the employment restrictions 
do not extend to entities near “areas where minors congregate.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (b)–(c) 
(2010). 
 34. A registered sex offender who knowingly violates the residency and employment restrictions 
“shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30 
years.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(g) (2010). 
 35. “Areas where minors congregate” are defined by statute as including all public and private parks 
and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus 
stops, public libraries, and public community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (2010). 
 36. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
and for a Permanent Injunction to Enjoin Enforcement of the “School Bus Stop” Provision of O.C.G.A. 
§ 42-1-15(B), 42-1-16(B) at 13–15, 19–20, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. Sept. 
15, 2006), available at http://www.schr.org/files/post/FACTS.pdf (noting that if the residency restriction 
were enforced as written, “[i]n many cases, all or nearly all persons on the registry . . . will have to 
move.”) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Statement]; Geraghty, supra note 1, at 520. 
 37. West, supra note 2, at 248 (quoting Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
 38. See generally Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010); Mann v. Ga. Dept. of Corr., 653 
S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007); Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006). 
 39. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf; see generally Debra Hunter & Paul 
Sharman, Note, Crimes and Offenses: Sexual Offenses, 23 GA. ST. L. REV. 11 (2006). 
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taking of his property.40 The Georgia Supreme Court found that the 
lack of a “grandfather clause” in the residency restrictions was 
improper.41 The court noted that without such protection for 
homeowners, “there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex 
offender can live without being continually at risk of being 
ejected.”42 
The restrictions were then amended to exempt homeowners who 
owned property prior to an entity where minors congregate 
establishing a location within the proscribed distance, thus 
grandfathering in pre-existing property owners.43 Subsequent 
amendment also exempted leaseholders whose lease agreements 
predate the establishment of a child-centered establishment within the 
forbidden distance, but only during “the duration of the executed 
lease.”44 Once the lease ends, the sex offender must move to a home 
in compliance with the restrictions.45 
Another challenge to the Georgia statutes was brought by a man 
required to register as a sex offender even though he was convicted 
for a non-sexual crime: false imprisonment.46 He challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute, claiming it was cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 742. 
 41. Id. at 745–46 (finding the residency restrictions constituted a taking when the plaintiff owned his 
home prior to the relocation of a childcare center nearby that violated the one-thousand-foot residency 
restriction, but finding no improper taking of his business because the statute does not prevent a sex 
offender from owning a business proximate to a childcare center, merely from working in such a 
business). 
 42. Id. at 742. 
 43. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(e) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(f)(3) (2010); S. 1, 149th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2008), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2007_08/pdf/sb1.pdf 
(amending residency restrictions in 2008 to provide that homeowners who are registered sex offenders 
do not violate state residency restrictions when a school, childcare center, or other area where minors 
congregate locates within one thousand feet of their residences). 
 44. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(e) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(f)(3) (2010); H.R. 571, § 13, 
150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010), available at 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb571.pdf (amending the residency restrictions in 2010 to 
allow leaseholders who are registered sex offenders residing on property leased prior to the location of a 
school, childcare center, or other area where minors congregate within one thousand feet to remain in 
their residence until the executed lease expires). The amendments also allow offenders with established 
employment to retain their employment if a childcare center, church, or school is later established within 
one thousand feet of their places of employment. 
 45. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(e) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(f)(3) (2010); Plaintiffs’ 
Statement, supra note 36, at 12–13. 
 46. Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. 2010). 
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punishment when the offense was not sexual in nature.47 The Georgia 
Supreme Court held that the law was constitutional, even applied to 
non-sexual offenses, because it has a rational relationship to the 
intent of the sex offender registration statute,48 even though the 
dissenting opinion pointed out that most instances of kidnapping and 
false imprisonment do not involve any sexual assault.49 
A pending suit in the U.S. District Court in the Northern Division 
of Georgia challenges the “school bus stop provision” of the 
residency restrictions.50 The 2006 amendment expanding the 
definition of “areas where minors congregate” to include school bus 
stops would ban registered offenders from living or working within 
one thousand feet of designated school bus stops,51 but has not yet 
been enforced in the state.52 Georgia registered sex offenders who 
would be forced to move or face imprisonment if the school bus stop 
provision were enforced have filed a class-action lawsuit against the 
state.53 As school bus stops are pervasive in residential areas and 
change frequently based on school enrollment, plaintiffs assert that 
the school bus stop provision violates due process because it is 
unconstitutionally vague.54 Because attempts to repeal the school bus 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 828–29. 
 48. Id. at 828–29 (finding that the registration statute was not over-inclusive in applying to offenders 
convicted of non-sexual crimes because the statute has a satisfactory rational relationship to the “State’s 
legitimate goal of informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm 
them;” and finding that the registry requirement was not cruel and unusual punishment because it is a 
regulatory requirement, not a punishment). 
 49. Id. at 830–31 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the registration statute is over-inclusive 
in including those whose offenses are not sexual in nature and “is clearly not rational” in treating all 
kidnappings and false imprisonments as sexual offenses, when research indicates less than half of such 
crimes involve sexual assault). 
 50. Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006). 
 51. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010). 
 52. Plaintiffs’ Statement, supra note 36, at 6, 9. 
 53. Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006). 
 54. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and for a Permanent 
Injunction to Enjoin Enforcement of the “School Bus Stop” Provision of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(B) and 
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-16(B), Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.schr.org/files/post/BUS%20STOP%20BRIEF%209%2015%2010.pdf (asserting 
that the school bus stop provision is unconstitutionally vague and violates substantive due process 
rights). In response to plaintiff’s motions in this case, the court has granted a temporary restraining order 
preventing the enforcement of the school bus stop provision of § 42-1-15(b), Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 
4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2006) (order granting temporary restraining order), as well as a 
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stop provision have been unsuccessful thus far, offenders seeking 
relief from this provision await the outcome of this suit.55 
C. Duration Of Georgia Sex Offender Registration Requirements 
Georgia statute requires sex offenders, including juvenile sex 
offenders, to register “for the entire life of the sexual offender.”56 The 
residency and employment restrictions apply to anyone required to 
register, so they also continue for the sex offender’s “entire life.”57 
Provided certain statutory criteria are met, the offender can petition 
to be released from the default lifetime registration requirements ten 
years after completing all prison, parole, and probation for the 
offense.58 The superior court then has the discretion to release the 
offender from the registration requirements or residency or 
employment restrictions—completely or in part, permanently or for a 
specific time period—based on the court’s assessment of whether the 
person poses a risk of perpetrating another sexual offense.59 
However, the possibility remains that a minor convicted as a sex 
                                                                                                                 
temporary injunction prohibiting enforcement of § 42-1-15 “to the extent that it restricts registered sex 
offenders from engaging in volunteer activities at churches,” Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-
CC (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009) (order granting preliminary injunction). Accordingly, the bus stop 
provision of the residency restrictions is currently unenforced due to the temporary order, although it 
remains in the statute. 
 55. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 529. 
 56. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(f)(6) (2010). 
 57. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a)(1) (2010) (invoking the registration requirement of GA. CODE 
ANN. § 42-1-12(f)(6)). 
 58. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19 (2010). The offender must remain on the registry for ten years after 
completing all prison, parole, and probation for the offense before petitioning for release from the 
registration requirements. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(c)(2) (2010). However, the offender may apply 
immediately upon completing all prison, parole and probation for the offense if he is: confined to a 
nursing home or hospice facility, totally and permanently disabled, or otherwise seriously physically 
disabled. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(a)(1) (2010). An offender may also petition for release from the 
registry if he was convicted for a felony that has since become punishable as a misdemeanor or was 
convicted of kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor and the offense was not sexual in nature. GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(a)(2)–(3) (2010). See Grovenstein v. State, 637 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) 
(vacating the registration requirement because the sexual offense was consensual oral sex with a 
fourteen-year-old when the offender was eighteen years old, which would be treated as a misdemeanor 
offense after the 2006 amendments to the sex offender registry statute). 
 59. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(f) (2010). This was clarified by a 2010 amendment; prior to this 
amendment the offender could petition to be removed from the registry, but could not appeal the 
residency and employment restrictions. H.R. 571, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010), available 
at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb571.pdf. 
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offender in Georgia will spend the rest of his life on the sex offender 
registry and must comply with the residency and employment 
restrictions for the duration of the registration requirement or risk a 
minimum prison sentence of ten years.60 For juvenile offenders, this 
may be a cruel and unusual punishment. 
II. APPLYING GRAHAM V. FLORIDA’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW TO GEORGIA’S SEX OFFENDER STATUTES 
A. Graham v. Florida: Evaluating Whether A Law Is “Cruel And 
Unusual” Based On Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida provides a 
model for reviewing whether a sentence is categorically “cruel and 
unusual” and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment.61 In 
Graham, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a sentence of 
life in prison without chance of parole for juvenile offenders who 
committed non-homicide crimes.62 When considering whether a 
punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the United States 
Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he concept of proportionality is 
central.”63 While some Eighth Amendment cases involve challenges 
to a sentence in a particular case, in Graham the Court considered 
categorical sentencing rules, evaluating the constitutionality of a life 
sentence without parole for any juvenile non-homicide offender.64 To 
                                                                                                                 
 60. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(g) (2010). 
 61. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022, 2027–31 (2010); State v. Gomez, 235 P.3d 1203 
(Kan. 2010) (discussing how the analytical framework of Graham could be applied to a categorical 
challenge of disproportionality to a sentence of life in prison with a mandatory minimum sentence of 
twenty-five years for a conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of 
fourteen). 
 62. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–19. Graham, who was sixteen years old at the time of the crime, was 
charged as an adult for burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery after attempting to 
rob a restaurant and hitting and injuring its manager. Id. at 2018. Graham pled guilty, and the trial court 
withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced him to probation. Id. Graham violated his probation within 
six months by participating in a home invasion robbery and possessing a firearm. Id. at 2018–19. The 
trial court then found Graham guilty of the earlier armed robbery and sentenced him to life in prison. Id. 
at 2020. In Florida, there is no parole system, so his sentence was for life in prison without parole. Id. 
Graham challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
 63. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 64. Id. at 2021–22. 
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consider whether the challenged sentence is constitutionally “cruel 
and unusual punishment” the Court evaluated proportionality, 
considering 1) whether there is a balance between the culpability of 
the offender and the severity of the punishment and 2) whether the 
sentence serves legitimate penological goals.65 The Court found that 
a sentence of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders 
is unconstitutional, based in part on considerations that juvenile 
offenders are less culpable than adults who commit the same acts.66 
The life sentence challenged in Graham is clearly different from 
the Georgia sex offender registry and residency and employment 
requirements.67 However, the Graham Court set forth a model for 
conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis of the proportionality of a 
categorical sentencing rule while considering “developments in 
psychology and brain science [that] show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds.”68 This model of proportionality 
review can be applied to Georgia’s sex offender registration and 
residency and employment restrictions to evaluate whether, taken 
together, they constitute cruel and unusual punishment when applied 
to juvenile offenders.69 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 2026. 
 66. Id. at 2026–27, 2034. 
 67. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-
1-19 (2010); Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
 68. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 69. The United State Supreme Court has found that requiring sex offenders to register with the state 
is not a punishment, which would preclude court challenges to sex offender registries under the Eighth 
Amendment. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003). The Georgia Supreme Court has also found 
that “current law does not deem registration as a sexual offender to be punishment.” Hollie v. State, 696 
S.E.2d 642, 643 (Ga. 2010). Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court asserts “sexual offender registry 
requirements such as those contained in OCGA § 42-1-12 are regulatory, and not punitive, in nature.” 
Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. 2010). Defining the registry requirements as regulatory rather 
than punitive has allowed states, including Georgia, to defend registration statutes against claims that 
they impose ex post facto punishments or sentences exceeding maximum statutory punishment. See 
Smith, 538 U.S. 84; Hollie, 696 S.E.2d at 643; Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 828. 
While registration requirements alone may be deemed regulatory, when considered with accompanying 
residency and employment restrictions Georgia’s requirements seem far more punitive. This Note 
applies Eighth Amendment analysis to the registration requirements of § 42-1-12 in tandem with the 
residency and employment restrictions of § 42-1-15. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-1-15 (2010). “Registration [and residency restrictions] limit[] where the offender can live, work, 
and congregate,” and they are “no mere administrative formality or minor inconvenience.” Rainer, 690 
S.E.2d at 831 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting). 
  The Georgia Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Taylor v. State, indicates the unique position of 
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1. Applying Proportionality Review to a Non-Capital Punishment 
Prior to Graham, the United States Supreme Court only applied 
categorical Eighth Amendment proportionality review to capital 
sentences—known as the “death is different” approach.70 In 
Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court expressly cabined categorical 
proportionality review to capital punishment, noting that the death 
penalty gives rise to “protections that the Constitution nowhere else 
provides” and declining to extend proportionality review further.71 
                                                                                                                 
sex offender registry requirements and residency and employment restrictions, and suggests that these 
requirements are punitive. 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). In Taylor, the appellant sought to 
withdraw his guilty plea to child molestation based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 385. His 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based in part on his counsel’s failure to advise him that he 
would be subject to Georgia’s sex offender registration requirements. Id. This claim turned on whether 
the sex offender registry requirement was a direct consequence of a guilty plea, meaning it “lengthens or 
alters the pronounced sentence” or only a collateral consequence, which would not give rise to a finding 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 387 n.3. The Taylor court applied factors delineated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, in determining whether failure to advise of a 
penalty that is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence” (in that case, 
deportation) can give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1481–82 (2010); Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–89. The Georgia Court of Appeals articulated: 
[R]egistration as a sex offender is “intimately related to the criminal process” in that it is 
an “automatic result” following certain criminal convictions; . . . [h]ence “[o]ur law has 
enmeshed criminal convictions and [sex offender registration]” such that it is “most 
difficult” to divorce the requirement of registration from the underlying criminal 
conviction. 
Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481). Further, the court noted that 
“registration as a sex offender, like deportation, is a ‘drastic measure’ . . . with severe ramifications for a 
convicted criminal,” including felony charges if a required registrant fails to comply. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d 
at 388 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478). For the purpose of establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the Taylor court found that sex offender registration is a “serious consequence” that must be 
disclosed by counsel to a criminal defendant considering making a guilty plea. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 
389. This treatment suggests that the Georgia registry and residency and employment restrictions are 
more punitive, rather than merely regulatory, in nature. 
  The United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part test in Smith v. Doe for determining 
whether a sex offender registry statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause: 1) did the state legislature act 
with punitive intent in creating the law, and if not 2) is the statute punitive in effect? 538 U.S. 84, 92 
(2003). While “the Georgia legislature’s stated intent is nonpunitive, the [residency and employment] 
statute’s effect is punitive,” especially considering the effects if the school bus stop provision were 
enforced. West, supra note 2, at 257 (emphasis added) (applying the Smith test to the Georgia residency 
restrictions and asserting that the statute is punitive in effect). 
 70. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561–64 (2005); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
994 (1991); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption 
Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 86, 87 (2010). 
 71. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (denying proportionality review for a life-without-parole sentence for 
a first-time drug offender, even though the sentence was notably severe). 
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In his concurrence in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy noted that 
proportionality had generally been applied to capital cases, but 
asserted that the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment 
also applies to noncapital sentences.72 Though it forbids “only 
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime,” 
these can include sentences short of death.73 In Graham, the approach 
voiced by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin was adopted by the Court, 
and a non-capital sentence was found unconstitutional under 
proportionality review.74 Thus, Graham opened the door for 
evaluating the proportionality and constitutionality of other non-
capital punishments.75 
2. Model of Proportionality Review Put Forth in Graham 
In Graham, the Supreme Court considered a categorical challenge 
to a term-of-years sentence, life without parole for a juvenile 
convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery, based on 
the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment.76 The Court 
uses a two-part analysis to consider such categorical challenges: first, 
do objective indicia suggest there is a national consensus against the 
sentencing practice; then second, does the punishment violate the 
Constitution based on the Court’s own interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment?77 When measuring “objective indicia of national 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 997, 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 997–98, 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 
(1983)). 
 74. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010); Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“Punishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one time may, in the light of reason and 
experience, be found cruel and unusual at a later time; unless we are to abandon the moral commitment 
embodied in the Eighth Amendment, proportionality review must never become effectively obsolete.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 75. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036–37 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 76. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021–23. The Court reviews two classifications of proportionality 
challenges: 1) challenges to the length or severity of a sentence based on the facts of a particular case, 
and 2) challenges based on categorical restrictions on the death penalty. Id. at 2021. The categorical 
challenges have included two subsets, one turning on the characteristics of the offense and the other 
turning on the characteristics of the offender. Id. at 2022. Graham presented a categorical challenge to a 
term-of-years sentence for a non-homicide offender, based on the offender’s characteristic of being a 
juvenile, thus questioning a non-capital sentencing practice generally rather than only as applied to the 
facts of this case. Id. at 2022–23. 
 77. Id. at 2022. See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
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consensus,” the Court considers legislative enactments permitting the 
challenged sentence for juveniles and actual sentencing practices.78 If 
the punishment is less common, the Court considers it to have less 
support from the national consensus.79 However, the Court notes that 
community consensus “is not itself determinative of whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual.”80 
The Court’s independent judgment of whether the sentence is cruel 
and unusual entails considering the culpability of the offenders and 
the severity of the challenged punishment.81 The culpability of the 
offenders should be assessed “in light of their crimes and 
characteristics.”82 In evaluating the punishment, the Court must also 
evaluate whether it serves legitimate penological goals.83 
Regarding the culpability of juvenile offenders, the Graham Court 
reiterated the holding in Roper v. Simmons that juveniles have 
diminished culpability as compared to adult offenders, and therefore 
“are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”84 A juvenile 
offender who commits a crime that, by its own nature, is less 
deserving of the most severe punishments “has a twice diminished 
moral culpability.”85 In evaluating the severity of the challenged 
punishment, the Court not only observed the harshness of the 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
 79. Id. at 2023–26. The Court weighed evidence that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, 
and federal law permit life sentences without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders under some 
circumstances against the rarity with which this sentence is actually applied. Id. at 2023–25. The Court 
also noted that many states do not specifically prohibit the sentence, but do not actually apply it. Id. at 
2025. “The sentencing practice now under consideration is exceedingly rare. And ‘it is fair to say that a 
national consensus has developed against it.’” Id. at 2026 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 
(2002)). 
 80. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 81. Id. at 2026. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. The Court considers whether the challenged sentence is justified by penological goals “that 
have been recognized as legitimate”: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at 
2028. 
 84. Id. at 2026 (affirming the holding in Roper that characteristics of juvenile offenders make them 
less culpable for their actions than are adult offenders, including: a lack of maturity and responsibility, 
greater susceptibility to negative influences, and a more transitory character (citing Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005))); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (articulating these “[t]hree 
general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults” that demonstrate the reduced culpability of 
juvenile offenders). 
 85. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. See Smith & Cohen, supra note 70, at 91–92 (discussing the 
significance of this “constitutional mathematics” in creating a new constitutional principle). 
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sentence generally, but specifically considered its severity as applied 
to a juvenile.86 The Court noted that juveniles and adults both 
sentenced to life without parole only nominally receive the same 
punishment because the effect of the sentence for a juvenile will be 
much more severe.87 Finally, the Court evaluated whether the 
challenged sentencing practice was supported by legitimate 
penological goals, and for each penological goal, the characteristics 
and immaturity of juvenile offenders undermined the justification for 
the sentence.88 Because of the diminished culpability of juvenile non-
homicide offenders, the severity of the challenged sentence, and the 
lack of justification by penological goals, the Court drew a bright 
line, categorically forbidding life-without-parole sentences for these 
offenders.89 
B. Scientific Research On Maturation And Its Implications For 
Culpability Of Juvenile Offenders 
Evaluating whether a punishment is cruel and unusual requires 
courts to apply societal morals and standards of decency, which 
change over time.90 Rather than being fixed, notions of cruelty 
involve moral judgments and, as noted by the United States Supreme 
Court, “must change as the basic mores of society change.”91 A 
punishment considered constitutionally permissible in the past may 
not be acceptable today, because our understandings of decency, 
culpability, or social values change over time.92 As science uncovers 
new information about adolescent development, our understanding of 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 2028–30 (finding that goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation do 
not justify a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile non-homicide offender, based largely on the 
characteristics and immaturity of juveniles). 
 89. Id. at 2030 (asserting that the Constitution “does not foreclose the possibility that [juvenile non-
homicide offenders] will remain behind bars for life” but that they must be given “some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”). 
 90. Id. at 2021 (“To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond 
historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))). 
 91. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972). 
 92. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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the culpability of juvenile offenders evolves, and consequently our 
evaluation of punishments for these offenders evolves as well. 
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that 
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders violated the Eighth 
Amendment, thus declaring a punishment previously considered 
constitutional to be cruel and unusual.93 The Roper Court found that 
there are three differences between juveniles and adults that diminish 
juveniles’ culpability.94 First, youths lack maturity and a sense of 
responsibility, so when they act irresponsibly, their conduct is less 
morally reprehensible than that of an adult.95 Second, juveniles have 
greater susceptibility to negative influences and peer pressure, and at 
the same time lack control over their environment and ability to 
escape those influences.96 Third, juveniles have a more transitory 
character and personality, undermining any conclusion that a juvenile 
who commits even a heinous crime has an “irretrievably depraved 
character.”97 The conclusions about juvenile culpability made in 
Roper were adopted by the Court in Graham as well.98 Since the 
Roper Court based its holding about the constitutionality of the 
punishment on its findings regarding adolescent development, which 
were then adopted in Graham, further scientific discoveries about 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 94. Id. at 569. 
 95. Id. (noting that juveniles are denied the same rights as adults because of their immaturity and 
irresponsibility); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“The reasons why juveniles are 
not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible 
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”). 
 96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting that while juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences, 
they also have less control over their own environments and “‘lack the freedom that adults have to 
extricate themselves from a crimogenic setting’” (quoting Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less 
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003))). 
 97. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. See also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 821 (“It is fair to assume 
that most adults who engage in criminal conduct act upon subjectively defined preferences and values, 
and that their choices can fairly be charged to deficient moral character. This cannot fairly be said of . . . 
juvenile actors, whose choices, while unfortunate, are shaped by development factors that are 
constitutive of adolescence.”). 
 98. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider 
the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. . . . [D]evelopments in psychology and 
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”). 
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maturation could either support the Court’s view of juvenile 
culpability or undermine it.99 
The Roper Court relied upon scientific and psychological research 
presented in amicus curiae briefs in making its conclusions about the 
differences between juveniles and adults.100 Critics have challenged 
the sufficiency of the scientific and psychological support for the 
Court’s conclusions regarding juveniles’ reduced culpability.101 
However, psychological and neurological research continues to 
support the Roper Court’s findings that the developmental 
differences between juveniles and adults are significant and impact 
culpability.102 
Different legal issues implicate different types of maturity.103 
While studies indicate that juveniles develop cognitive skills early 
and may perform cognitive tasks comparable to adults by age sixteen, 
they are not equal to adults with respect to psychosocial skills, 
including impulse control and resistance to peer pressure.104 This 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 15, 331 (reporting the authors’ conclusion from 
studies of brain development, that “[b]ased on neurobiological data alone, it is clear that children and 
adolescents are different both structurally and functionally from adults”); Lawrence Steinberg et al., Are 
Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the 
Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 
812–20. 
 100. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 380–81, 380 n.8 (2006) (noting the Court’s reliance on a “substantial number 
of amici briefs,” the majority of which (sixteen out of eighteen) were submitted on behalf of the juvenile 
respondent, including briefs by the American Psychological Association, American Bar Association, 
and President Jimmy Carter). 
 101. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 617–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging as contradictory claims 
by the American Psychological Association in its amicus brief for petitioner that minors “lack the ability 
to take moral responsibility for their decisions” when the Association also submitted an amicus brief in 
another, unrelated case urging that minors were mature enough to make abortion decisions without 
parental involvement); Denno, supra note 100, at 381 (asserting that the Court failed to cite adequately 
and relied too heavily on a few resources and some outdated resources). 
 102. Psychological and brain research indicates that juveniles differ from adults in their cognitive and 
psycho-social development, and that risky, even illegal, behavior is a common element of identity 
development for juveniles. See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 15; Steinberg et al., supra 
note 99; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 812–20. 
 103. Steinberg et al., supra note 99, at 585–86, 593. 
 104. Id. at 586 (“[O]ur findings, as well as those of other researchers, suggest that whereas 
adolescents and adults perform comparably on cognitive tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities 
. . . that permit logical reasoning about moral, social, and interpersonal matters—adolescents and adults 
are not of equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial capacities listed by Justice Kennedy in his 
opinion in Roper—capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer influence.”). 
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psychosocial immaturity means that in circumstances that usually 
accompany criminal activities, juveniles find themselves facing “the 
very conditions that are likely to undermine adolescents’ decision-
making competence.”105 Thus, while juveniles may be capable of 
making mature decisions under some circumstances, their 
psychosocial immaturity justifies considerations that they are less 
culpable than adults when they engage in criminal activities.106 
Reflecting this understanding of the effects of maturation on 
juveniles, the Court has found immaturity to reduce culpability when 
evaluating the constitutionality of capital punishment and a life 
sentence without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.107 The 
same considerations can also be applied in evaluating other 
sentences, such as those prescribed under Georgia sex offender 
statutes. 
C. Applying Graham To Georgia’s Statutes 
Applying the Eighth Amendment analysis of Graham to the 
Georgia sex offender registration and residence and employment 
restriction statutes as applied to juvenile offenders involves three 
inquiries. First, is there a national consensus opposing the application 
of these statutes to juvenile offenders?108 Second, considering the 
nature of the crime and characteristics of the juvenile offenders, is the 
severity of the punishment justified?109 Third, does the punishment 
serve legitimate penological goals?110 
1. Indicia of National Consensus 
In Graham, the indicia considered to evaluate whether the national 
consensus supported the challenged sentence were legislative 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. 592. 
 106. Id. 592–93. 
 107. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (finding a life sentence without parole 
unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding 
the death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders). 
 108. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 109. Id. at 2022, 2026. 
 110. Id. 
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enactments enabling the sentencing practice and actual use of the 
sentence.111 While the requirements for registration of juvenile 
offenders vary, all states require at least some juvenile offenders to 
register.112 However, only thirteen states impose residency and 
employment restrictions on registered sex offenders, while five states 
impose only employment restrictions.113 These requirements are 
automatically imposed upon offenders convicted under these 
statutes.114 
The existence of registration requirements for juvenile sex 
offenders in every state indicates that the national consensus favors 
sex offender registration; however, the fact that only a quarter of the 
states require juvenile offenders to comply with residency and 
employment restrictions suggests a lack of consensus supporting such 
restrictions.115 Even in the states that have residency restrictions, the 
parameters vary.116 For example, Mississippi forbids any registered 
sex offender from living within fifteen hundred feet of schools or 
childcare centers,117 Montana only imposes residency restrictions for 
violent offenders whose victims were minors,118 and New York 
imposes no residency restrictions but forbids sex offenders from 
owning or operating ice cream trucks.119 Georgia’s statutes are far 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 2023. 
 112. SMITH, supra note 31 (reporting sex offender registration requirements for all states and the 
District of Columbia). Examples of different treatment of juvenile sex offenders include Colorado, 
where juveniles convicted as adults and adjudicated as delinquent must register (COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 16-22-103(4) (2008)); Georgia, where only juveniles charged as adults must register (GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-1-12 (2010)); and Arkansas, where juveniles adjudicated as delinquent are assessed and a court 
hearing is held to determine whether they are obligated to register as sex offenders (ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-27-356 (2008)). Id. 
 113. SMITH, supra note 31 (reporting residency and employment restrictions based on proximity to 
schools or other child-focused centers in thirteen states (Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Tennessee) and 
employment restrictions in five states (California, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, and New York)). 
 114. SMITH, supra note 31. 
 115. Id.; cf. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–25 (finding the national consensus did not favor the 
challenged sentencing practice when it was permitted in thirty-eight jurisdictions and under federal law, 
but only rarely applied, and noting that the scarcity of jurisdictions prohibiting the practice does not 
undermine the consensus against it). 
 116. SMITH, supra note 31. 
 117. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25 (2008). 
 118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225 (2008). 
 119. N.Y. CORRECT. § 168-v (McKinney 2008). 
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more restrictive than any other state’s in forbidding all registered 
offenders from living within one thousand feet of schools, childcare 
centers, churches, and areas where children congregate, a broad term 
encompassing pools, skating rinks, playgrounds, and school bus 
stops.120 Georgia is thus an outlier in national practices restricting sex 
offenders. 
2. Balancing the Juvenile’s Criminal Conduct and the Severity of 
the Punishment 
Comparing the criminal conduct to the severity of the punishment 
involves considering the nature of the crime and the characteristics of 
the offender.121 In this Note, the relevant characteristic of the 
offenders is their juvenile status, which warrants their treatment as 
less culpable than adults who commit the same acts.122 The nature of 
the crimes triggering sex offender registration requirements varies 
greatly; however, offenders are all subject to the same residency and 
employment restrictions.123 The stated purpose of the restrictions is to 
protect the public, particularly from recidivist or violent sex 
offenders and those who prey on children.124 However, the 
uniformity of application of the statutes means they are also applied 
to offenders whose behavior is not predatory or even sexual in 
nature.125 The restrictions also have a uniquely harsh effect on 
juveniles because the laws prohibit them from living or spending 
time near schools and establishments that exist for juveniles, thus 
prohibiting them from carrying out their usual activities once 
released from any prison or probation sentence.126 While there will 
be circumstances in which this punishment is not excessively severe 
                                                                                                                 
 120. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010); SMITH, supra note 31; West, supra note 2, at 239–41, 254– 
55. 
 121. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). 
 122. See supra Part II.B. 
 123. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); Geraghty, supra note 1, at 518. 
 124. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf. 
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). 
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in comparison to the criminal offense, because it is applied uniformly 
there will also be circumstances where it will be excessively punitive. 
3. Penological Goals 
The penological goals considered by the Graham Court include 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.127 In 
Graham, the Court held that the juvenile status of the offender 
undermined each of these goals, and so the goals did not justify the 
punishment.128 Because of the diminished culpability of a juvenile 
offender, the justification of retribution is less compelling.129 
Juveniles’ lack of maturity makes them less susceptible to 
deterrence.130 While the possibility of punishment for their conduct 
could be known, it may provide limited deterrence to juveniles 
because their immaturity makes them less likely to make decisions 
based on a possible punishment.131 The Graham Court acknowledged 
the importance of the goal of incapacitation, but on the facts of the 
case found the level of incapacitation to be disproportionate, in part 
because of Graham’s youth.132 Finally, the Graham Court noted that 
juveniles “are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation,” but the 
challenged sentence did not provide rehabilitation opportunities.133 
Those same penological goals also do not provide strong 
justification for imposing sex offender registration requirements and 
residency and employment requirements uniformly to juvenile 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–30 (2010). 
 128. Id. (“[N]one of the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate . . . provides 
an adequate justification.”). 
 129. Id. at 2028 (“[R]etribution does not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less 
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”). 
 130. Id. (“‘[T]he same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that 
juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.’” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 
(2005))). 
 131. Id. at 2028–29 (noting that due to immaturity, juvenile offenders are “less likely to take a 
possible punishment into consideration when making decisions”). 
 132. Id. at 2029 (noting that because his crime, attempting to rob a restaurant and striking the 
manager, may reflect transient immaturity, “Graham deserved to be separated from society for some 
time . . . but it does not follow that he would be a risk to society for the rest of his life.”). 
 133. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30 (noting that a sentence of life in prison without parole denies an 
opportunity to rehabilitate and that by “denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the 
State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society”). 
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offenders. The penological justification of retribution is reduced for a 
juvenile offender, and particularly weakened when the offense 
triggering the punishment is non-violent or consensual, as are some 
offenses giving rise to sex offender status.134 For behaviors like 
“sexting,” juveniles may not even be aware that such behavior could 
lead to being convicted as a sex offender, so the sentence will be less 
effective as a deterrent.135 
Unlike a prison term, residency and employment restrictions do 
not completely accomplish a goal of incapacitation. The sex 
offenders are out of prison and capable of interacting with potential 
victims, even though the restrictions significantly limit their freedom 
and opportunities.136 Thus, the Georgia restrictions set notable 
boundaries on offenders without actually incapacitating them from 
committing subsequent offenses.137 Finally, the Georgia statutes do 
not deny an offender any opportunity for rehabilitation, but they 
prevent her from fully incorporating back into society.138 This is 
particularly true for a juvenile offender whose usual environment 
may be forbidden by the restrictions. 
In short, the juvenile status of sex offenders undermines the 
penological goals considered in Graham when offered to justify 
imposing residency and employment restrictions on all juvenile sex 
offenders. Considering this along with the underwhelming national 
support for imposing residency and employment restrictions of the 
type Georgia imposes and the severity of the punishment for some 
crimes that give rise to sex offender status, the Georgia statutes 
appear to violate the Eighth Amendment when applied uniformly to 
juvenile offenders. 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 2028 (noting that the case for retribution is undermined by the offender’s juvenile status, 
and further undermined by the nature of his crime, a non-homicide offense); see supra Part I.A. 
 135. Scott, supra note 10 (reporting the confusion of schools, parents, and juveniles about possible 
legal consequences for sex-related misuse of new technologies like cell phones and computers). 
 136. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). 
 137. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010). But see Geraghty, supra note 1, at 518; West, supra note 2, at 
239–41, 254–55 (asserting that Georgia’s residency and employment restrictions are so severe they 
effectively banish sex offenders from the state). 
 138. Compare the residency and employment restrictions (GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010)) with the 
life-without-parole sentence of Graham that “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal [b]y denying 
the defendant the right to reenter the community.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
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III. REMEDYING PROPORTIONALITY FOR JUVENILES UNDER 
GEORGIA’S SEX OFFENDER STATUTES 
To remedy proportionality concerns about Georgia’s sex offender 
statutes as applied to offenders who are minors, the laws should be 
changed to provide different treatment for juvenile offenders, rather 
than applying to them the same as adult offenders. 
A. Juvenile Sex Offenders Should Be Treated Differently Than Adults 
Under Georgia Law 
Changes in the treatment of juvenile offenders throughout legal 
history reflect changes in our understandings of those offenders. As 
social attitudes about juvenile offenders changed, from seeing them 
as wayward children needing rehabilitation at the inception of 
juvenile justice systems during the Progressive era to seeing them as 
hardened deviants threatening society since the 1980s, their legal 
treatment also changed.139 While early juvenile justice systems 
separated minors from adults and focused on rehabilitation, later 
trends were to treat juvenile offenders as adults and subject them to 
the harshest punishments.140 
Current scientific and psychological research suggests that 
immaturity of juvenile offenders mitigates culpability141 and supports 
different treatment under the law for children and adolescents.142 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 804–09 (reporting the history of the legal treatment of 
juvenile offenders and the conceptualizations of juveniles and their culpability that undergirded different 
approaches to juvenile offenders). 
 140. Id. at 804–07 (tracking the shift from the Progressive reforms that created the juvenile justice 
system for rehabilitating offenders seen as “misguided children rather than culpable wrongdoers” to the 
contemporary reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that led to younger offenders being punished as adults for 
more crimes, fueled by “an exaggerated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of 
offenders, and collective hostility toward the [juvenile] offenders”). 
 141. Id. at 801 (“First, the scientific evidence indicates that teens are simply less competent decision 
makers than adults, largely because typical features of adolescent psycho-social development contribute 
to immature judgment. . . . Second . . . [y]outhful involvement in crime is often a part of [the process of 
developing identity and character], and, as such, it reflects the values and preferences of a transitory 
stage, rather than those of an individual with a settled identity.”). 
 142. Id. at 829–31 (noting that “a culpability line should be drawn between children and adolescents,” 
with pre-adolescent children being excused from responsibility for criminal behavior due to their 
extreme immaturity, but only mitigating the culpability of adolescents based on the maturity differences 
distinguishing them from adult offenders). 
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However, in Georgia once a juvenile is found guilty of a sexual 
offense, rather than being adjudicated delinquent, the juvenile is 
treated identically as an adult offender under the law.143 Because they 
are less culpable than adult offenders, juvenile offenders should be 
treated differently under the law.144 
For some circumstances, the current sentencing may be 
proportional and appropriate even for juvenile offenders,145 but for 
other conduct, the underlying behavior is not the sort contemplated 
by the stated purpose of the Georgia sex offender statutes.146 Peer-on-
peer behavior, nonviolent conduct, and consensual conduct by 
juveniles can trigger the requirement to register as a sex offender.147 
Were these sorts of conduct perpetrated by an adult offender upon a 
minor victim, the sentence would conform to the intent of the 
legislature to target predators. However, in these circumstances, the 
juvenile status of the offender defeats the state’s concern with adults 
taking advantage of minors. 
Further, the effects of the residency and employment restrictions 
are unique and harsh for juvenile offenders, because the offenders are 
forbidden from places intended for youth in the community: schools, 
churches, and areas where their peers congregate.148 The stigma of 
being publicly labeled a sex offender can be especially harmful to 
                                                                                                                 
 143. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010). 
 144. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
569 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823–24 (1988). 
 145. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (“The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on 
the analysis.” (emphasis added)); cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73 (holding that individualized 
consideration did not warrant imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile offender and instead 
categorically banning the punishment for juveniles). The challenged punishment in Roper, the death 
penalty, is far more severe than the sex offender registry and residency and employment restrictions 
discussed in this Note, and therefore triggers stronger consideration of the reduced culpability of 
juvenile offenders. Id. The Roper Court acknowledged that many juvenile offenders have committed 
brutal crimes and that “a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has sufficient psychological 
maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death,” although 
it does not concede that point. Id. at 572. 
 146. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ga. 2006), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf (declaring the intent of the Georgia 
legislature in implementing the residency and employment restrictions to address the “extreme threat to 
the public safety” posed by “recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and 
sexual offenders who prey on children”). 
 147. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10) (2010). 
 148. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). 
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adolescents, whose developmental stage makes them highly 
susceptible to peer influence and judgment.149 Juvenile sex offenders 
face a minimum of ten years in prison for living or loitering near 
their own schools or from finding employment at businesses catering 
to youth and likely to hire teenagers.150 Because juveniles are likely 
to live with their families, rather than independently, the residency 
restrictions would affect not only the juvenile sex offender, but their 
entire family because the family would have to comply with the 
residency restrictions or else separate.151 
B. Changing Georgia’s Sex Offender Laws 
The violation of the proportionality principle when these laws are 
applied to juveniles,152 the differential effects of Georgia’s sex 
offender registration statutes on juveniles compared to adults,153 and 
the failure of these statutes in fulfilling legislative intent,154 all lead to 
the conclusion that juvenile offenders should be treated differently 
under the law. To alter the existing framework of Georgia’s sex 
offender statutes, several changes should be made to the statutes, 
which could be incorporated comprehensively or individually. First, 
courts should conduct individual assessments of juvenile sex 
offenders to determine whether they should be required to comply 
with registration requirements, and also whether they should be 
required to comply with residency and employment restrictions. 
Second, the default registration term for juvenile offenders should be 
a term of years, rather than the rest of their lives. 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 813–14; Brown, supra note 15, at 369–70 (providing an 
example of a Delaware teenager required to register as a sex offender, due to conduct perpetrated when 
he was eleven years old, who became suicidal and required extensive psychiatric treatment after being 
bullied and teased by classmates because of his registration status). 
 150. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). 
 151. Id.; Plaintiffs’ Statement, supra note 36, at 13–17, 19–20 (noting that in one Georgia county that 
has officially designated school bus stops, every one of the four registered juvenile sex offenders in the 
county would have to move to comply with residency restrictions). 
 152. See supra Part II.B. 
 153. See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 146. 
26
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/7
2012] GEORGIA JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS 555 
 
1. Individual Assessment for Juvenile Offenders 
For juvenile offenders, even when tried as adults, courts should 
conduct individual assessment of the culpability of the offender and 
the risks they pose in relation to the purposes of the residency 
statutes.155 Based on the circumstances of the case, the trial court 
should determine whether the offender poses the threats to children 
and society contemplated by the registration requirement, considering 
the nature of the crime and the age and characteristics of the juvenile 
offender. Then, the trial court can apply the registration requirement 
as warranted rather than automatically upon conviction.156 Courts 
should also have the discretion to apply the residency and 
employment restrictions to juvenile sex offenders, or waive those 
restrictions for some juveniles.157 This would allow courts to evaluate 
the culpability of the offender before labeling a juvenile offender a 
“sex offender” and to consider the unique effects of the residency and 
employment restrictions on minors and their families before 
implementing them. 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See supra note 146. The intent of the legislature in passing the residency and employment 
restrictions was to protect the public from “recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use 
physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children.” Id. 
 156. Some other states give courts discretion in ordering offenders to register. SMITH, supra note 31. 
For example, under Arkansas statute, if a juvenile offender is adjudicated delinquent for certain sex 
crimes, the court must conduct a “sex offender screening and risk assessment” to determine whether it 
will require the offender to register as a sex offender; there is not an automatic requirement that juvenile 
sex offenders register. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-356 (2008). Factors the court considers in evaluating 
whether the offender must register include: seriousness of the offense, level of planning and preparation, 
any previous sex offense history, availability of rehabilitative programs, and assessments of the 
juvenile’s mental, social, physical, and educational history. Id. 
 157. Some other states give courts discretion to determine when offenders must comply with 
residency and employment restrictions, or limit which offenders must comply with the restrictions. 
SMITH, supra note 31. For example, under Louisiana statute residency restrictions are only applied to 
“sexually violent predators,” not every person required to register as a sex offender. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.1 (2008). In Montana, only violent offenders whose victims were children are subject to 
residency restrictions, and the judge has discretion to impose “reasonable” employment restrictions. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-255 (2008). 
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2. Shorter Default Registration Requirements for Juvenile Sex 
Offenders 
Rather than making lifetime registration the default sentence for all 
offenders, the default registration requirement should be shorter for 
juvenile offenders. By statute, courts could be allowed to extend the 
requirements further if merited by the circumstances of a case, but 
the default registration requirement should be a set term of years158 or 
until a threshold age, such as twenty-one or twenty-five, has been 
reached.159 Setting a default registration requirement shorter than the 
offender’s lifetime would acknowledge the transitory nature of 
juveniles’ characters, rather than painting them as sex offenders for 
life based on juvenile conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Georgia’s sex offender registration and residency and employment 
restriction statutes have faced, and continue to face, legal 
challenges160 and criticism that they are excessively harsh.161 These 
statutes apply to juvenile offenders charged as adults and to adult 
offenders alike, even though both United States Supreme Court 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence162 and current scientific research163 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Some other states require registration of sex offenders only for a term of years, depending on 
various factors. SMITH, supra note 31. For example, Alabama has a lifetime default registration 
requirement for adult sex offenders, but juvenile sex offenders are only required to register for ten years. 
ALA. CODE § 15-20-33 (2008). Louisiana and Minnesota provide examples of the many states that have 
tiered registration requirements, with lifetime requirements for violent or recidivist sex offenders, and 
terms of years for other offenders. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:544 (2008) (establishing a three-tiered 
system with registration requirements of fifteen years, twenty-five years, and lifetime of the offender); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (2008) (establishing a two-tiered system with registration requirements of 
ten years or lifetime of the offender). 
 159. For example, in Arizona, juvenile sex offenders’ registration requirements end at age twenty-
five. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (2008). In Arkansas, juvenile offenders can petition to be 
removed from the sex offender registry at age twenty-one, but if they are denied, the registration 
requirement terminates ten years after the offense. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-356 (2008). 
 160. See, e.g., Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010); Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 
740 (Ga. 2007); Grovenstein v. State, 637 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 
4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006). 
 161. See, e.g., West, supra note 2; Geraghty, supra note 1. 
 162. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 163. See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 15; Steinberg et al., supra note 99; Scott & 
Steinberg, supra note 15, at 812–20. 
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embrace the notion that juvenile offenders are less culpable than 
adult offenders committing the same acts. The uniform application of 
sex offender registration and residency and employment restrictions 
to minor offenders is not justified by the intent of the legislature164 
and raises the question of whether they violate the proportionality 
principle of the Eighth Amendment.165 While some circumstances 
may warrant applying the statutes to a juvenile as they are applied to 
adult offenders, this should not be default or automatic. Rather, the 
statutes should be changed so that they continue to protect citizens 
from harm while also accommodating the unique position of juvenile 
offenders. 
Rather than being automatically labeled “sex offenders” upon 
conviction for certain crimes, juvenile offenders should be 
individually evaluated to determine whether their conduct is the 
violent, predatory conduct the statutes seek to prevent.166 Even when 
requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders, courts should use 
discretion in applying the residency and employment restrictions to 
juvenile offenders. The default lifetime requirement for sex offender 
registration also should be ameliorated for juveniles.167 Instead of 
labeling minors as sex offenders for life, any registration requirement 
should be for a shortened term of years or until attainment of a 
certain age. 
Given what society continues to learn about juvenile development, 
which the United States Supreme Court acknowledges reduces the 
culpability of youthful offenders,168 there is little justification for 
continuing to treat juvenile sex offenders uniformly the same as 
adults. Individual assessment of juvenile offenders and shorter 
default terms under the registration statutes could help address Eighth 
Amendment proportionality concerns raised by the current Georgia 
statutes. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See supra Part III.B. 
 165. See supra Part II.C. 
 166. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 167. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 168. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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